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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case raises two important questions.

First, whether the Idaho Court of

Appeals erred by issuing a purely advisory opinion on an issue of first impression
regarding the Idaho Constitution.

And, second, whether Article X, Section 5 of the

Idaho Constitution, which places the duty to control, direct, and manage parole on the
Board of Correction, precludes a parole officer from delegating her duties to local police,
thus making them "agents" of the Board.

FILED-COPY
APR 16 2015
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Dustin Thomas Armstrong pied guilty to grand theft after an on-call parole officer
asked the Boise Police to search ~.1r. Armstrong's car, purportedly according to a waiver
provision in Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement.

That provision provided that

Mr. Armstrong would submit to a search of person or property, including his vehicle, "at
any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services." 1

During the

search, the police found a safe containing financial documents belonging to
Mr. Armstrong's mother and charged Mr. Armstrong with grand theft.

Mr. Armstrong

filed a motion to suppress that evidence, arguing that the Boise Police were not "agents"
within the terms of his parole agreement.

After the district court denied the motion,

Mr. Armstrong entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal from the
denial of the suppression motion.
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong argued that the Boise Police could not be "agents" of
probation and parole under the parole agreement because Article X, Section 5 of the
Idaho Constitution specifically places the non-delegable duty to control, direct, and
manage parole on the Board of Correction.
Mr. Armstrong's conviction in a published opinion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed
See State v. Armstrong, 2015

Opinion No. 6 (Feb. 12, 2015) (the "Opinion"). The Court of Appeals held that, because
Mr. Armstrong did not raise the Article X, Section 5 issue below, it was not preserved.
(Opinion, pp.4-6.)

But because of the "high likelihood" that the constitutional issue

would arise in the future, the Court of Appeals went on to decide that Mr. Armstrong's
Article X, Section 5 argument had no merit. (Opinion, pp.6-8.)

According to the State, Field and Community Services no longer exists, but was
renamed the Bureau of Probation and Parole. (R., p.102.) To prevent confusion,
Mr. Armstrong will refer to that agency as "probation and parole."
1
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Mr. Armstrong asks that this Court review this case.

Although he requests

review of all the issues, the most compelling reason for review is the Court of Appeals'
handling of the merits of this case.

The Court of Appeals contravened this Court's

general prohibition of advisory opinions when it purported to decide, in lengthy and
detailed dicta, the merits of this case. In doing so, the Court of Appeals also incorrectly
decided an issue of first impression regarding the Idaho Constitution.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Thirty-five year old Dustin Armstrong was a parolee under the supervision of the
Board of Correction. (Tr., p.24, Ls.18--22.)2 As part of his parole agreement, he agreed
to "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any
time and place by c.1ny agent of [probation and parole] and s/he does waive
constitutional right to be free from such searches."

(Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression

Hearing.)
One evening in February 2013, Mr. Armstrong's mother came home to find her
car running in the driveway with the doors and windows open. (Tr., p.29, L4 - p.30,
L.1.) When she asked Mr. Armstrong what he was doing, he said he was charging his
cell phone. (Tr., p.30, Ls. 2-6.) She told him, "this isn't right," and asked him to leave,
so he did. (Tr., p.30, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Armstrong returned the next morning. (Tr., p.30,
Ls. 7-8.) He asked his mother whether there were any accounts with money in them for
him. (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.) She denied having any accounts or any money.

(Tr., p.30,

The record on appeal includes two transcripts. A transcript of the hearing on
Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress held on July 3, 2013, and, as an exhibit, a transcript
of the preliminary hearing. All transcript citations in this brief are to the transcript of the
hearing on Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress.
2
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Ls.-18-19.) He told her "[t]hat's fine. I'll have my attorney take care of it" (Tr., p.30,
Ls.20-21.) Mr. Armstrong's mother could tell he was "distracted," and having seen him
on methamphetamine before, she felt he was high, so she told him to pack his things
and leave. (Tr., p.30, Ls.23--25, p.34, Ls.18--22.) Mr. Armstrong informed his mother, "I
just want you to know, Mom, when I turn 39, I will have family benefits on my dead
mom." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5.) His mother went to her sister's house, called the police, and
reported that she believed her son was using drugs. (Tr., p.31, Ls.6--10.)
Officer Mattie Chally of the Boise Police Department received a dispatch
"narcotics call" about Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.47, Ls.6-10.) She then called the "on-call
probation and parole phone number" and spoke to Laila Jeffries. (Tr., p.48, Ls.5-6,
p.50, L.25 -- p.51, L.1.) Ms. Jeffries is a probation and parole officer, although she did
not supervise Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-5, p.38, L.15.) About once a year, she
has a shift where she is the on-call officer, meaning she has a phone which law
enforcement can call. Ms. Jeffries testified that officers like Officer Chally "call us all the
time on it." (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-13.)

"[P]retty much all of the time, if I get a phone call that

they've got a parolee or probationer pulled over, I ask for a K9 search of the vehicle."
(Tr., p.39, Ls.1-4.) Her standard response to hearing that a parolee has been stopped
for running a stop sign is, "[y]es, he's on parole. Can you please search through the
vehicle for me?" (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-20.)

She regularly has other agencies conduct

searches: "[l]t's just the way we do things." (Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.8.)
Officer Chally spotted Mr. Armstrong leaving his mother's house and followed
him to a local credit union. (Tr., p.48, L.11 - p.49, L.16.) True to form, Ms. Jeffries
asked Officer Chally to do a K9 search of Mr. Armstrong's car.
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(Tr., p.38, Ls.7-23.)

Ms. Jeffries could have gone down to assist in the search, but didn't. (Tr., p.44, Ls.2325.) Rather, she simply told Officer Chally, "[i]f you find anything, if you need me down
there, I'll come down." (Tr., p.44, L.12--17.) In fact, no one from probation and parole
went to where the police confronted Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22.)
Mr. Armstrong was inside the bank when two uniformed officers approached him.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.10-25.) They asked to speak with him, so Mr. Armstrong went outside
with them. (Tr., p.1 ·1, L.24 - p. ·12, L.15.) At that time, the officers were not aware of
any crime that Mr. Armstrong had committed.

(Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.74, L.2.) When

speaking with the officers, Mr. Armstrong was "calm," "easy, laid-back going," "polite,
very respectful" and cooperative. (Tr., p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.2, p. 79, Ls.10---12.) So the
officers pat-searched him. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-14.)
While two officers detained Mr. Armstrong, Officer Challey had Officer Jerry
Walbey run a K9 search on Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) The dog did not
alert when he was run on the outside of the car.

(Tr., p.91, Ls.5-15.)

So Officer

Walbey put the dog in the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.16-18.) Once inside, the dog alerted on a
safe behind the driver's seat. (Tr., p.89, Ls.23-24.) It turned out that the safe belonged
to Mr. Armstrong's mother, Mr. Armstrong had never opened the safe before, and
Mr. Armstrong did not know what was in the safe. (Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.16.) His
mother claimed that she had never stored any drugs in the safe and none were found
inside. (Tr., p.94, Ls.15-16, p.95, Ls.3-5.)
The State charged Mr. Armstrong with grand theft for taking the safe, which had
contained a "checkbook and/or financial documents" belonging to his mother.

5

(R., pp.37-38.) Counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the
warrantless search of Mr. Armstrong's car. (R., pp.54-55, 63--64.)
The district court initially granted Mr. Armstrong's motion, finding that the search
was unreasonable and that "Boise City police are not agents of [probation and parole],"
such that "the scope of the search exceeded that that (sic] was permitted by this waiver,
and therefore was an unlawful search." (Tr., p.121, L.23

122, L.17.) The State filed a

motion to reconsider asserting that any law enforcement officer acting on behalf of
probation and parole is permitted to conduct searches of a parolee under the plain
language of Mr. Armstrong's waiver because they are agents of probation and parole.
(R., pp.96-97.) The State also asserted that probation and parole had delegated the
task of searching Mr. Armstrong's vehicle to the Boise Police.

(R., pp.1Ol-103.) On

reconsideration, the district court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. The court
found that "[t]he parole agent in this case authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in
her place in conducting a search of [Mr. Armstrong's] vehicle. This is the very definition
ofan agent." (R., pp.116-117.)
Mr. Armstrong entered into a binding plea agreement with the State, reserving
his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.126-27.)

After

sentencing, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and Mr. Armstrong timely
appealed. (R., pp.134-41.)
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong argued that the search of his vehicle fell outside of the
scope of the parole agreement because Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution
specifically places the duty to control, direct, and manage parole on the Board of
Correction, and so an on-call parole officer cannot delegate that duty to local police.

6

The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Armstrong's conviction in a published opinion
in February 2015. The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Armstrong had failed to preserve
the Article X, Section 5 issue. (Opinion, pp.4-6.) But because of the "high likelihood"
that the constitutional issue would arise in the future, the Court of Appeals went on to
decide that Article X, Section G did not preclude parole agents from delegating the duty
to search a parolee to the local police, and therefore the search fell within the scope of
Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement.

(Opinion, pp.6-8.)

Finally, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the district court's decision that the Boise Police acted as "agents" within the
plain language of the parole agreement. 3 (Opinion, pp.8-10.)

3

Mr. Armstrong will not address that portion of the Court of Appeal's decision because
Mr. Armstrong conceded on appeal that the Boise Police purported to act as agents
within the terms of his parole agreement. However, that finding is irrelevant if
Mr. Armstrong prevails on his Article X, Section 5 argument.
7

ISSUES
1.

Are there special and important reasons for this Court to review this case?

2.

Given that Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the exclusive duty
to control, direct, and manage parole on the Board of Correction, did the district
court err when it determined that an on-call parole officer can delegate that
constitutional duty to local police, thus making them agents of the Board?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
There Are Special And Important Reasons For This Court To Review This Case
This Court may grant a petition for review only "when there are special and
important reasons" for doing so, but, uitimately, the decision of whether to grant review
lies within the sound discretion of this Court I.AR. 118(b). In exercising that discretion,
the Court must consider the following non-exhaustive factors:

·1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression;
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further appellate
review is desirable.
I.A. R. 118(b ).
There are special and important reasons for this Court to review this case.
Despite deciding this case on the preservation issue, the Court of Appeals contravened
this Court's general prohibition of advisory opinions by purporting to decide the merits of
this case.

In doing so, the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided an issue of first

impression regarding the Idaho Constitution.

A.

The Court Of Appeals' Unusual Decision On This Constitutional Issue Of First
Impression Runs Afoul Of This Court's Prohibition Of Advisory Opinions
Despite explicitly deciding that Mr. Armstrong did not preserve the constitutional

issue, the Court of Appeals purported to decide the constitutional issue because of the

9

"high likelihood" that it would come up again in the future. (Opinion, p.6.) In doing so,
the Ccurt of Appeals did not mention this Court's general prohibition of advisory
opinions, nor did it discuss whether it would be appropriate to issue an advisory opinion
in this case.

(See id.) This unusual decision, which contradicts this court's general

prohibition of advisory opinions, warrants review.
"This Court is not empowered to issue purely advisory opinions." 4 Taylor v. AIA

Servs. Corp., 15·1 Idaho 552, 569 (2011) (citing MOS lnvs., L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho
456, 464-65 (2003)); State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9 (2010) ("In effect, the State is
asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases;
an exercise this Court will not undertake."). However, "[t]his Court can always exercise
its discretion to consider additional matters under its plenary jurisdiction." Izaguirre v.

R & L Carriers Shared Servs., 155 Idaho 229, 232 (2013) (citing ID. Cm-JST. art. V, § 9
("The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the
district courts ... "). But see State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 871 (2009) (in which this
Court remanded after discussing Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32, which was not
raised below, but did not cite to Article V, Section 9 to support that unusual advisory
ruling).
This Court "rarely exercise[s] this plenary power of review, which [it] narrowly
appl[ies] and limit[s] to compelling cases." State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 24 (2014 ). For

4

"[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has used the term 'advisory opinion' to denote a
number of different judicial actions, including judgments subject to later review by other
branches of the federal government, formal advice on proposed courses of conduct,
decisions in moot or unripe cases, decisions in cases in which the plaintiff lacks or
arguably lacks standing, and any portion of an opinion not absolutely necessary to the
resolution of the case (i.e., obiter dicta)." Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional
Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
10

example, an advisory opinion may be warranted if the case "presents an important issue
that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community," or involves an
"important and reoccurring question[] in the construction of criminal statutes, the
resolution of which will be of practical importance in the administration of the criminal
justice system in this state and prevent improper dismissals and reduce erroneous
rulings." Id.;

see also State v. Loomis,

146 Idaho 700, 704 (2009) ("Historically, [this

Court has] rarely invoked [its] plenary power, and generally only do[es] so to clarify
important points in the construction of criminal rules and statutes which are likely to
recur in the future."); Turpen, 147 Idaho at 87'1 (finding "it appropriate to give guidance
to the courts of this State in dealing with [frequently recurring]

requests for

expungement of court records," even though the parties had not addressed i.C.A.R. 32
below).
Although this Court has recognized that it has the discretion to issue advisory
opinions, it does not appear that this Court has condoned the Court of Appeals' use of
advisory opinions.

See State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 170-72 (Ct. App. 2012)

(surveying decisions either issuing or declining to issue advisory opinions, but not citing
any decision in which the Court of Appeals issued an advisory opinion). Mr. Armstrong
contends that the Court of Appeals should not have the authority to issue advisory
opinions. But, even if it did, the Court of Appeals should not have issued an advisory
ruling in this case.
Only this Court should have the authority to issue advisory opinions because only
this Court, as the court of last resort in Idaho, can serve the underlying purpose of
advisory opinions.

This Court will issue an advisory opinion only in narrow and

11

compelling circumstances in which an important issue is likely to recur. See Glenn, 156
Idaho at 24; Loomis, 146 Idaho at 704; Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871; Long, 153 Idaho at
'170-72. In fact, that is the precise reason why the Court of Appeals issued the advisory
opinion in this case--it believed the issue was highly likely to recur. (Opinion, p.6.) But
an advisory opinion issued by this Court will undoubtedly have a very different effect on
a recurring issue than will an opinion from the Court of appeals. An advisory opinion
issued by this Court sends a clear message to litigants and the lower courts-although
that decision is not binding, the Court will decide that particular issue in that particular
way if it comes before the Court again. But the sarne opinion from the Court of Appeals
reads differently-the Court of Appeals may decide that particular issue in that particular
way if it comes before them again, but the Idaho Supreme Court may in fact disagree

with Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Opinion's only practical effect is to discourage
defendants from asserting the same argument Mr. Armstrong asserted here.

But

because the merits of the Opinion are merely advisory dicta, and this Court has yet to
decide the issue, defendants will be free to raise this issue in the district courts and
appeal the issue to the Idaho Appellate Courts, thus undermining the very purpose of
issuing an advisory opinion in the first place.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals has the authority to issue advisory
opinions, it should not have done so in this case. Here, the Court of Appeals purported
to decide an issue of first impression regarding the Idaho Constitution, not the mere
construction of criminal rules and statutes.

See Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24; Loomis,

146 Idaho at 704. And, as explained above, the fact that this issue may come up again
in the future not validate the Court of Appeal's decision to issue an advisory opinion
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because the Opinion will in no way prevent this issue from reoccurring.

See Glenn,

156 Idaho at 24; Loomis, ·145 Idaho at 704. Finally, the Opinion is not necessary to give
guidance to the effected legal community. See Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24. It appears that
local police and probation and parole are already acting consistently with the Opinion
(see Tr., p.39, Ls. ·1-4, p.41, L:12 - p.42, L.24 ), and defense attorneys are still free to

argue that delegations from probation and parole to local police are unconstitutional.
In short, the Court of Appeals should not have the authority to issue advisory
opinions, but, even if it does have that authority, it should not have done so here. The
Court of Appeals' unusual attempt to decide an issue of first impression regarding the
Idaho Constitution in lengthy and detailed dicta is a special and important reason for this
Court to review this case.

B.

The Court Of Appeals Incorrectly Decided This Issue Of First Impression
Regarding The Idaho Constitution
On appeal, Mr. Armstrong relied on the non-delegation doctrine to argue that

because Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the duty to control, direct,
and manage parole on the Board of Correction, the Board cannot simply excuse itself
from that duty by delegating it to another entity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) Therefore,
the on-call parole officer did not have the authority to delegate her constitutional duty to
the Boise Police, and the Boise Police could not have been "agents" within the scope of
Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement. (Id.)
The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court of Appeals narrowly construed the
non-delegation doctrine to prohibit only the delegation of decision-making authority,
without regard to the precise duty the delegating entity is charged with. (Opinion, p.7.)
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From that premise, the court concluded that "performing a search is not equivalent to
engaging in 'the control, direction and management' of parole and parolees."
(Id. (quoting ID. CONST. art. X, § 5).) The court reasoned that "[a]lthough performing
parole searches is a part of that duty, it does not involve any decision-making authority
if done at the request and under the direction of a parole officer."

(Id. (emphasis

added).) The court found that the police here conducted the search "at the request and
direction of his parole officer," and therefore the delegation did not exceed constitutional
limitations. (Opinion, p.8.) The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided this issue of first
impression, which warrants review of this case.
First, the Opinion relied on one inopposite case regarding legislative delegation
to find that the non-delegation doctrine applies only to a delegation of decision-making
authority:
Only when constitutionally entrusted decision-making authority is
delegated to another branch of government will the non-delegation
doctrine be implicated. See, e.g., State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 543
(1977) (discussing the standards for determining 'whether a legislative
delegation of decision making authority is constitutionally proper').
(See Opinion, p.7 (emphasis added).) But Kellogg did not hold, or even imply, that the
non-delegation doctrine applies only to a delegation of decision-making authority
regardless of the type of duty the delegating entity is charged with. 5 Kellogg's framing

5

The relevant passage from Kellogg states:
In considering whether a legislative delegation of decision making
authority is constitutionally proper, this court held in Boise Redevelopment
Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972) that: "It is
clear that the legislative power of the state is by our Constitution vested in
the Senate and House of Representatives and it is a fundamental principle
of representative government that, except as authorized by organic law,
the legislative department cannot delegate any of its power to make laws
to any other body or authority. It is also clear, however, as stated in
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of the issue therefore cannot be blindly applied to a delegation of the Board's duty to
control, direct, and manage parole.
To the contrary, what amounts to an impermissible delegation necessarily
depends on the specific duties the constitution places on the delegating entity.

See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon
The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 133 (6th ed. 1890) (the
"powers ... specifically conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any
other specified officer," must be performed by that officer); In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
128 Idaho 246, 260 (1995) (recognizing "the power of the courts to ultimately decide the
cases presented to them, granted by Article V, Section 20 of the Constitution, has never
been, and can never be, delegated to executive agencies.").

Crucially, the Idaho

Constitution gives the Board and its employees the exclusive duty to control, direct, and
manage parole, including on-the-ground supervision of parolees. See Report of Prison
Committee, Appointed January 5, 1940, (the "Report"), p. 6 (probation and parole's
"now unsatisfactory operation is based upon the fact that there is a complete dirth of

qualified administration officers, therefore, it can be truthfully said that we have no
system of parole and probation of a scientific type whatsoever.") (emphasis added), p.7
("The supervision of the paroled offender should be exercised by qualified persons

trained and experienced in the task of guiding social readjustment.") (emphasis added);
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 231 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that "[fjor probation

Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752, 780
(1953), that: "Although the legislature cannot delegate its power to make
a law or complete one, it can empower an agency or an official to
ascertain the existence of the facts or conditions mentioned in the act
upon which the law becomes operative."
98 Idaho at 543 (internal citations omitted).
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authorities to evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the
probation officer must have a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment
and personal habits."). Therefore, the Board cannot delegate any part of its duties, and
the on-call parole officer's delegation of that duty runs afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine.
Second, the Court of Appeals incorrectly found that "this case d[id] not involve
any delegation of decision-making authority whatsoever" because the police here
conducted the search "under the direction of the parole officer."

(Opinion, pp.7-8.)

Mr. Armstrong does not disagree that "[a] parole officer may ... enlist the aid of the
police when conducting a justified search." State v. Peters, 130 Idaho 960, 62 (Ct. App.
·1997) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 233 (Ct. App. 1983)
(a parole officer "may enlist the aid of police officers in performing his duty." (emphasis
added)). But the Idaho Appellate Courts have not condoned searches in which a parole
officer delegated his entire duty and was not even present for the search. See State v.
Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 907 (Ct. App. 2007) (in which a parole officer and two police

officers searched a parolee's residence); Peters, 130 Idaho at 961 (in which a parole
officer decided to search a parolee, asked local police to assist him in the search of a
parolee's residence, and stood outside while the police conducted the search); State v.
Vega, 110 Idaho 685, 687 (Ct. App. 1986) (in which a parole officer and police officer

searched a parolee's residence); Pinson, 104 Idaho at 230 (in which a probation officer
and police officer searched the probationer's home). Indeed, "[c]ourts have perceived a
distinction between searches of probationers conducted by a supervising probation
officer and those conducted by the police.

16

The 'special and unique' interest which

probation authorities have in invading the privacy of probationers 'does not extend to
law enforcement officers generally."'

Pinson, 104 Idaho at 233 (internal citations

omitted).
Here, the on-call parole officer, Ms. Jeffries, did not merely "enlist the aid" of the
local police "in performing [her] duty."

See Pinson, 104 Idaho at 233.

She in fact

delegated her entire duty to search, and was not present for that search even though
she could have been.

(See Tr., p.44, Ls.23--25.) Further, although the Boise Police

conducted the search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle at the request of Ms. Jeffries, they did
not conduct the search under Ms. ,Jeffries' direction.

Again, Ms. Jeffries was not

present for the search and the only instructions she gave to the Boise Police was that
that they should conduct a K9 search and let her know whether they found anything.
(Tr., p.38, L.21 -- p.40, L.24, p.44, Ls.12-25.)

Nothing in the record indicates, for

example, that Ms. Jeffries asked the police to place the drug dog inside Mr. Armstrong's
car to search. (See Tr., p.38, Ls.21-23 (Ms. Jeffries responding that she "requested a
K9 search" when asked whether she requested a "general search or a specific type of
search"), p.51, Ls.6-10 (Officer Chally responding that Ms. Jeffries "requested a K9
search, drug detection K9 search" when asked whether Ms. Jeffries requested a
"specific type of search"), p.89, Ls.10-12 (Officer Wal bey answering affirmatively when
asked whether Officer Chally requested that he perform a K9 search).)

But that is

precisely what the police did. (Tr., p.89, Ls.15-19 (Officer Walbey stating: "I got the
dog out. I walked around the vehicle. I didn't see any obvious hazards. At that point I
had the clog sniff the exterior of the vehicle and the interior subsequently after that.")). It
thus appears that the police did in fact make decisions regarding the scope of the

17

search.

The Idaho Appellate Courts have not previously condoned such a broad

delegation. See Cruz, 144 Idaho at 907; Peters, 130 Idaho at 961; Vega, 110 Idaho at
687; Pinson, ·104 Idaho at 230.
Ms. Jeffries' complete delegation of her duty, as opposed to asking the police for
mere assistance with a search, runs afoul of the non-delegation doctrine. The Court of
Appeals incorrectly decided this issue of first impression, and thus this Court should
review this case.

IL

Given That Article X Section 5 Of The Idaho Constitution S ecificall Places The Out
To Control Direct And Mana e Parole On The Board Of Correction The District Court
Erred When It Determined That An On-Call Probation And Parole Officer Can Delegate
That Constitutional Du To Local Police Thus Making Them Agents Of The Board
The district court erred by denying Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. Article
X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution places the exclusive duty to direct, control, and
manage parolees on the Board of Correction. Because that constitutionally-placed duty
is non-delegable, the on-call parole officer's attempted delegation of that duty failed.
Therefore, the Boise Police could not have been agents of probation and parole within
the terms of Mr. Armstrong's parole agreement.

A.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.

The appellate

court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). "While this Court gives
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when considering a case on
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review from that court, it reviews the district court's decision directly."

Loomis, 146

ldallo at 702 (citing State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819,821 (2007)).

B.

This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Place Additional Burdens On
A Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A
Warrantless Search
As an initial matter, the Article X, § 5 issue is properly before this court. In its

response brief below, the State asserted that because "[Mr.] Armstrong did not argue
that Article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution ipso facto prevented the parole officer from
allowing law enforcement officers from other agencies to act as her agent," so
Mr. Armstrong failed to preserve the issue and this Court should not consider it.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9--10.) The Court of Appeals agreed. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The
Court of Appeals further explained that, even though Mr. Armstrong met his burden of
production when he established that the police conducted the search without a warrant,
meeting that burden did not relieve Mr. Armstrong of the requirements of preserving
arguments for appeal.

(Opinion, p.6, n.3.) Mr. Armstrong contends that the Court of

Appeals erred in finding that Mr. Armstrong failed to preserve the constitutional issue.
"The burden is on a defendant to show the illegality of a search; however, once
the search is shown to have been made without a warrant, the search is deemed to be
unreasonable per se ... " State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842 (1999). The burden of
proof then rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486 (2004) (citation omitted). When
the State seeks to rely upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement, "[t]he
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burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies." State v. Hansen,
151 Idaho 342, 346 (20·11 ).

Despite the State's claims to the contrary, Mr. Armstrong met his burden of proof
below when he objected to the admission of the evidence and the State conceded that
the police discovered the evidence during a warrantless search of Mr. Armstrong's
vehicle. See Tucker, 132 Idaho at 842. By doing so, Mr. Armstrong preserved the only
issue he needed to preserve---the warrant!ess search of his vehicle.
Although Mr. Armstrong acknowledges that he did not specifically raise Article X,
Section 5, he could not have waived the ability to address that issue on appeal.

First, it

was the State's affirmative burden to prove that the police were agents of probation and
parole, including that the duty to perform a parole search was delegable in the first
place. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486. Second, Mr. Armstrong did argue below, as
he argued on appeal, that the police were not "agents" of probation and parole.
(See Appellant's Brief, p.12) The State's failure to establish a necessary prerequisite to

agency does not prevent this Court from addressing the question.
Moreover, the cases cited by the State and the Court of Appeals do not support
the contention that Mr. Armstrong waived this issue. The State cited to three cases to
support its argument, in which either the objection, grounds for the objection, or relief
requested were different below than on appeal. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878,
883-4 (2005) (in which this Court declined to address whether a witness should have
been excluded from testifying as a discovery violation sanction because the defendant
never requested a sanction in the trial court); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454
(1993) (finding that the defendant failed to preserve his argument regarding testimony's
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helpfulness because the d€3fendant objected only to the lack of foundation for testimony
below); State v. Holland, ·135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000) (declining to address the
constitutionality of a seizure when the defendant oniy challenged the search below);
see also State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596-597 (1992) (cited by the Opinion, p.5
(declining to address the defendant's objection to admitting a child abuse expert's
testimony under I.RE. 404(a)(1) because below the grounds for that objection were that
the testimony would be merely conclusory in nature regarding the veracity of the
victim).)
Here, on the other hand, Mr. Armstrong asserted the same objection, grounds for
the objection, and requested relief below and on appeal. Additionally, in none of the
above cases did this Court hold that a defendant has the burden of objecting to, and
disproving, each of the exceptions to the warrant requirement asserted by the State.
Rather, this Court has clearly stated that the burden to prove an exception to the
warrant requirement is on the State. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486.
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are similarly off-point. The majority of
those cases involved a defendant's failure to even object in the first place. See State v.
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009) (declining to address the defendant's
argument that the trial court should have sua sponte removed a biased juror because
the defendant did not object to seating a juror at trial); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934,
940 (1994) (declining to address the defendant's challenge to admitting the testimony of
lay witnesses regarding whether the victim was suicidal because the defendant did not
make that objection to the testimony below); State

21

v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992)

(declining to address the defendant's arguments regarding the lesser included offenses
statute, I.C. § ·19--2'132, because the defendant did not object to tho statute below).
The Court of Appeals also cited to a handful of cases in which the defendant
failed to sufficiently raise a threshold issue and therefore waived it State v. Frederick,
149 Idaho 509, 513 (2010) (holding that because the defendant mentioned Article I,
Sections 13 and ·1? of the Idaho Constitution only in passing, he could not argue on
appeal that those sections afford greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution; State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407 (1992) (same); State v.
Headley, 130 Idaho 339, 340 (1997) (declining to address the defendant's argument

that the officer had no authority to arrest him under I.C. § 49-·1407 because below the
defendant argued only that there was no probable cause for his arrest); State v.
Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 47 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the defendant failed

to preserve his argument, in support of his objection for lack of foundation, that the
State had failed to establish the reliability of test performed by a machine used to test
methamphetamine because below he argued only that the machine lacked some sort of
certification).
But here, Mr. Armstrong moved to suppress the evidence under both the U.S.
and Idaho Constitutions, proved the Boise Police searched his vehicle without a
warrant, and, when it was the State's burden to show that the consent exception
applied, Mr. Armstrong also specifically disagreed with the State's assertion that the
Boise Police were "agents" of probation and parole.

Cases such as Frederick,

Wheaton, Hidley, and Contreras-Gonzalez, in which the defendant failed to raise a

threshold issue, are thus inapplicable to this case.
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Finally,

none

of

the

cases cited

by the

Court of Appeals

undermine

Mr. Armstrong's argument that because he had me his burden of proof below he could
not have waived this issue, and the Court of Appeals failed to meaningfully address that
argument. (See Opinion, pp.4-6 & n.3.) The court only mentioned that argument in a
footnote, in which it acknowledged that Mr. Armstron~J met his burden of production
when he established that the police conducted the search without a warrant, but found
that meeting that burden did not relieve Mr. Armstrong of the requirements of preserving
arguments for appeal.

(See Opinion, p.6 n.3.) The Court of Appeals did not, however,

cite any case !aw to support that contention. (Id.) Given that the practical effect of the
Court of Appeal's holding places an additional burden on a defendant who has shown
that the police conducted a search without a warrant, the holding conflicts with the
general assignment of burdens of proof in search and seizure cases and should be
reversed. See Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486.

C.

The Boise Police Could Not Have Been Agents Of Probation And Parole Per The
Terms Of Mr. Armstrong's Parole Agreement Because Article X, Section 5 Of
The Idaho Constitution Places A Non-Delegable Duty To Control, Direct And
Manage Parole On The Board Of Correction
Mr. Armstrong waived his constitutional right to be free from searches "by any

agent of [probation and parole]." (Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression Hearing.) The district
court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress finding, "[t]he parole agent in this case
authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in her place in conducting a search of the
Defendant's vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent." (R., pp.116-117.) At the
heart of this ruling, and what it presupposes, is that Ms. Jeffries, an on-call parole
officer, had the authority to delegate the Board's constitutional duty to control, direct,
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and manage parole to another entity. Because Ms. Jeffries did not have that authority,
the district court erred in finding that Boise Police officers who conducted the search
were agents of probation and parole under the terms of Mr. Armstrong's waiver.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Armstrong's motion to
suppress.

1.

Article X, Section 5 Specifically Places The Out{ To Control, Direct, And
Manage Parole On The Board Of Correction

The Idaho Constitution creates the Board of Correction which has "the control,
direction and management of ... adult probation and parole, with such compensation,
powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law." ID. CONST. art. X, § 5. Although the
''[l]egislature implemented this constitutional directive by enacting" statutes, "the
enabling acts of the [l]egislature involved no delegation of legislative authority."

Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrs., 114 Idaho 494, 499 (Ct. App. 1988). Rather, "[t]he
Board ultimately derives its powers from article 10, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution." Id.
In interpreting this section, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that, although the
legislature may define the circumstances under which the Board may exercise its
authority, the Board continues to have exclusive control over parole once those
circumstances arise. Determining whether a defendant is eligible for parole during his
sentence "is within the legislative scope of establishing suitable punishment for the
various crimes . .

Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852 (1975).

Thus, "the

circumstances under which the functions are to be exercised by the state board of
corrections are to be prescribed by the laws enacted by the [l]egislature."

Rawson, 100 Idaho 308, 313 (1979).

State v.

'The board of correction continues to have
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exclusive control over adult probation and parole in those situations where the
legislature has provided by law that parole is available ... " Id. (emphasis added).
Under this distribution of power, once an adult is placed on parole, the Board maintains
exclusive control, direction, and management of that parolee.
Moreover, the intent in placing the duty to control, direct, and manage parole in
the Board was to professionalize parole supervision and have it executed by employees
of the Board. In 1940, a prison committee submitted a report to Governor Bottlolfson
regarding the "needs of the State Penitentiary and the Probation and Parole laws .... "
Report, Cover Letter, p.1. The committee noted that "Idaho has has [sic] a probation
and parole law on its statutes books, which includes many of the essential provisions for
a good probation and parole system." Report, p.6. However, the committee recognized
that there were problems with the current system: "Its now unsatisfactory operation is
based upon the fact that there is a complete dirth of qualified administration officers,
therefore, it can be truthfully said that we have no system of parole and probation of a
scientific type whatsoever." Id.
The committee recommended a series of changes to better effectuate a
probation and parole system.

Report, pp.1-2, 6-7.

For example, the committee

believed that "[t]he supervision of the paroled offender should be exercised by qualified
persons trained and experienced in the task of guiding social readjustment." Report,
p.7.

The committee also recommended that then Article X, Section 5 be completely

stricken from the Idaho Constitution: "This will permit the state legislature then to set up
a separate board of penal administration and a board of probation and parole or to
combine the two in the interest of economy."
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Report, p.9.

Finally, the committee

suggested that Idaho create a new non-political Board of Correction to also serve as a
board of 8du!t probation and parole, a supervisor of probation and parole, and a
probation and parole system with full-time, joint probation and parole officers assigned
to "serve the courts of ~1is district as a Probation Officer and the State penitentiary as a
Parole Officer." Report, pp.1, 7.
Although Idaho implemented many of the proposed changes, they were not
implemented in exactly the way the committee recommended. Instead of simply striking
Article X, Section 5 from the constitution, the legislature amended that provision in ·t 941
and the people ratified it in 1942.

Rather than leaving the decision of who would

supervise parolees to the legislature, the people of Idaho, through the Idaho
Constitution, mandated that the Board of Correction have that duty.
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as
the state board of correction. . . . This board shall have the control,
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state, their
employees and properties, and of adult probation and parole, with such
compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law.
ID. CONST. art. X, § 5. In 1947, the legislature passed enabling statutes establishing the
Board of Correction. 1947 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 53, §§ 1-47. These session
laws recognized the Board's authority to employ and fix the duties of officers "for the
administration of the parole and probation system ... " Id. at§ 14.
This history shows that, with the purpose of professionalizing the parole system,
the people of Idaho placed the on-the-ground duty to control, direct, and manage
parolees on the Board of Correction and its employees.
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2.

Because ThQ Duty' To Control, Direct, And Manage Parole Has Been
Constitutionally Placed On The Board Of Correction It Cannot Be
Delegated To Another Entity

Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the people, have located
certain authority it must remain. Cooley, supra, ·137; Cf State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,
228 P. 796, 797 ("1924) (relying upon Cooley to find, "[o]ne of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the [l]egislature to make laws cannot
be delegated by that department to any other body or authority."); In re SRBA Case
No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 260 (recognizing "the power of the courts to ultimately decide

the cases presented to them, granted by Article V, Section 20 of the Constitution, has
never been, and can never be, delegated to executive agencies."). In specific reference
to the executive duties, "such powers as are specifically conferred by the constitution
upon the governor, or upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or
authorize to be performed by any other officer or authority; and from those duties which
the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law." Cooley, supra, 133.
Because the people of the State of Idaho constitutionally mandated that the
Board have the duty to supervise parolees, the Board cannot excuse itself of that duty
by delegating it to another entity such as a local police force.

3.

Because That Duty Is Non-Delegable, The Boise Police Officers Were Not
Agents Of Probation And Parole

An agent is a person authorized to act for or in the place of the principal.
Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 151 (2005).

"Any person who is sui juris and has

capacity to affect his or her legal relationships by giving consent to a delegable act or
transaction may authorize an agent to act for him or her with the same effect as if such
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person were to act in person."

Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,

154 Idaho 5·11, 517 (20·13) (citing 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 9 (2002)).

However, "[i]f

performance of an act is not delegable, its performance by an agent does not constitute
performance by the principal." Restatement (Third) Of Agency§ 3.04(3) (2006).
As argued above, the constitutional duty to supervise parolees is non-delegable.
Thus, the search of Mr. Armstrong's car conducted by the Boise Police does not
constitute a search conducted by probation and parole.
Agency § 3.04(3).

See Restatement (Third) Of

Simply put, the officers were not agents of probation and parole

because the on-call parole officer, like the legislature, did not have the power to
delegate the Board's duty to supervise parolees.

4.

Because Mr. Armstrong's Waiver Only Encompassed Actual Agents Of
Probation And Parole, The Warrantless Search Violated Mr. Armstrong'§
Constitutional Rights To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And
Seizures

The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S.

CONST.

amend. IV; ID.

CONST.

art. I,§ 17. A search without a warrant is

per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 444-45 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement is a

search conducted with consent voluntarily given by a person who has the authority to do
so. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). "It is well settled
that when the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent."
150 Idaho 745, 749 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

State

v.

Turek,

"The standard for measuring the scope of a
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consent to search is that of objective reasonableness." State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728,
731 (2002) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).

The Court must

exclude evidence discovered during an illegal search as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484--86 (1963); see also State v. Koivu,
·152 Idaho 511, 518-·l 9 (2012) (holding that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created
remedy for searches and seizures that violate the constitution).
The scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver was limited to searches conducted by
agents of probation and parole. (Ex.1 to 7/3/13 Suppression Hearing (Mr. Armstrong
would "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at
any time and place by any agent of [probation and parole) and s/he does waive
constitutional right to be free frorn such searches.").) As argued above, the Boise Police
officers were not agents of probation and parole. The search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle
exceeded the scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver and was therefore not conducted
pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
222; Turek, 150 Idaho at 749. The evidence obtained as a result should have been
excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86; State v.
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518-19. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Armstrong's
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Armstrong respecifully requests that this Court grant review of all the issues
in this case.

Assuming it does, Mr. Armstrong further asks the Court to reverse the

district court order denying his motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand
his case for further proceedings.
th

DATED this 16 day of April, 2015.

MAYA P. 'WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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